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SPINOZA AND THE CARTESIAN PHYSICS
BY BIRGER R. HEADSTROM
THOUGH Spinoza was deeply indebted to the philosophical con-
ceptions of Descartes, it was rather on the physical side that he
felt the latter's power more full}' ; and this is to be expected for
it was through his physical teachings that Spinoza first made his
acquaintance. Such being the case, it would be reasonable to assume
that the Cartesian physics played no small part in defining his
philosophical development ; and that this is so can be seen not only
by the appearance in Deo ct Hotninc, and by traces in the Efliica,
of Descartes' account of motion, but equal!}- as well b}' the bearing
of the Cartesian theory of d}namics on Spinoza's conception oi
the material world. Yet, exacth' to what extent this influence ex-
tended can onl}' be shown b}- a comparison of \-arious i)assages in
his writings with the second part of Descartes' Priiicipia Philoso-
phiac, a work from which Spinoza derived most of his ])h}sical
ideas.
In several places, Spinoza speaks of "certain things imniediatel}-
produced by God." in explanation of which he oilers the following
passage in his essay on God and Man : "As pertaining to Xatura
naturata in general, that is, the modes or creatures \\hich imme-
diately depend on God or are created b}- him, of such we know two
and only two, namely, motions in matter, and understanding in the
thinking thing. Of these we say that they have been from all
eternity, and to all eternity shall remain immutable, a work cer-
tainly as great as befits the greatness of the master-worker (part i,
cap. 9)."^ In another passage, he says that extended bodies differ
onl}' in "proportion of rest and motion;'" and that a body is impelled
to motion by the impact of another body possessing motion greater
than its rest (Deo et Homine, part ii^ note ad init. and cap. 19) ;-
1 Vide Eth. 1. propp. 21, 23, 28, schol.; Ep. 66, No. 8.
- Cf. Ethica, 4, 39.
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while in the Tracfatus Theologico-Politicus (c.vii. No. 27) we read
of res niaxiine universales et toti naturae communes, videlicet motiiui
et quietem, eoriimque leges et regulas. And in a letter of 1675,
he gives motion and rest as examples of those "things immediately
produced by God." For Spinoza, then, motion and rest were not
relative terms but real things.
According to Descartes, matter, or any body considered gen-
erally, consists only in extension in three dimensions, and not in
hardness, weight or any other such quality; and that all matter
is ultimately homogeneous {in toto imiverso una et eadem existit) ;
while the variations in its properties are determined by differences
of motion {oninis materiae variatio, sive omnium eius formarum
diversitas, pendet a motu) , the relative nature of which is shown
by nullum esse permanentem uUius rci locum, nisi quatcnns a
cogitatione nostra deferminatur. Furthermore, he tells us, the
quantity of motion in the universe is constant, a proposition which
he demonstrates a priori from the perfection of God; and from
which we are to assume that God not only maintains a rigid immu-
tability in his operations but that in the beginning he created a
certain quantity of motion and rest which he preserves unchanged
:
materiam siimd cum motu et quiete in principio creavit, ianiqite
per solum suum concursum ordinarium tantundem niotus et quietis
in ea toto, quontum time posuit, conservat. Rest, however, is not a
real thing, and though Descartes did not probably look upon it in
that sense, he yet appears to be somewhat confused on this point
for he says somewhat later that motion is contrary to rest, and
that speed is contrary to slowness "inasmuch as such slowness
shares the nature of rest." And though Spinoza speaks of finite
existence as "de nihilo participans, "partaking of nullity [cogit.
Met. pt. ii.c. 3. Xo. 1), it is clear that he did not view nothing as a
real thing. In any case, he accepted without question the conserva-
tion of motion as prescribed by Descartes, which principle, though
not true, indicates at least that Descartes was not far from a definite
truth, only he lacked the patience to carry his speculations to their
logical conclusion.
By the term "quantity of motion" Descartes understood what
is now known as momentum, a quantity which has direction as well
as magnitude, though he failed to take this into consideration for
he assumed that the sum of indiscriminately directed quantities was
constant, a proposition not only erroneous but incomprehensible as
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no method is gi\en by which velocity can be determined. To
him. motion is separate from its direction, "the determination of
motion towards this or that part ;" and further asserts that the total
quantity of motion is not only the same after as before a collision
of two bodies but remains the same even though the direction is
reversed. And though he avers that such two bodies must be
viewed as an independent system (a reliquis onimhus sic diz'isia itf
corinu motus a nullis aliis circuiniaccntibus iiupcdirciifitr Jicc iiiz'ar-
ciificr), he mentions cases in which one of them is at rest, as well
as of cases in which the}' move with different velocities. That his
results Avere wrong is beside the point ; what is more interesting
is that Spinoza accepted all his rules except one.'"
What Descartes was after was a principle which would enable
him to treat the material universe as a machine self-acting and self-
contained ; and by postulating an original creative act which fur-
nished the matter of the universe with its fixed "quantit}- of motion."
he was able to effectively meet theological criticism, at that time a
no small matter; while Spinoza, fully con\inced of the perfect unity
of the divine nature and its manifestations, found in his s\stem
scientific evidence in proof of that unity and uniformit}' which
speculation had alread}' led him to anticipate in the ph}sical world.
In naming luotiis ct quics as being those things not onl}- infinite
in their kind but necessary to the existence of finite things of the
same kind, looking upon water as merely figured extension, Spin-
oza's views of motion and rest, though derived from the most con-
fused part of the Cartesian ph}'sics, become, in a sense, intelligible,
for b}' substituting energy of motion and energy of position a
rather happy result is attained. Beside being the most fundamental
propert}' of the physical world, energy is continually passing, in
all natural phenomena, from one portion of matter to another:
while equally as well the sum of kinetic energy and potential energ}-
is constant. From which it follows, that if energy is taken as this
sum, it becomes that which is infinite and immutable.
Spinoza, besides being indebted to Descartes for his ph}sical
ideas, derived from him. as well, his starting-point for human
ps}xhology and ethics. According to Descartes [Princ. Phil. 2.c.
37). "everything, in so far as it is simple and undivided, remains
in the same condition and undergoes no change unless from external
causes," a proposition which is repeated by Spinoza in much
3 Epistle 15, No. 10.
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the same words of his "Principles of Cartesian Philosophy:"
Unaquaeque res, qiiatemis simplex et indivisa est, ct in se sola coii-
sideratur, quantum in sc est, semper in eodem statu perseverat.
though the demonstration he offers is couched in such language as
to indicate that to him it was something more than merely physical :^
while in the Cagitata Metaphysica appears the idea of the self-
preserving effort of things, "conatus quo res in statu suo perseverae
conantur," this effort being merely the thing itself, in illustration
of which Spinoza gives the first law of motion: "Motion has the
power of persisting in its actual condition. Now this power is
nothing but the motion itself, that is, the fact that such is the nature
of motion."^ While furthermore, Unaquaeque res, qiiautiim in se
est, in suo esse perseverare conatur, (Everything, so far as it is in
itself, endeavours to persist in its own being) "^ and Conatus, quo
unaquaque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praetcr
ipsius rei actualcni cssentiam, (The endeavour wherewith everything
endeavours to persist in its own being is nothing else than the
actual essence of the thing itself)' expressed in physical terms
simply means that no change can take place in a system without
work being done.
Yet, despite all he owed to the physical conceptions of Descartes.
Spinoza, towards the end of his life, became deeply dissatisfied with
them, as can be seen from his letters to Tschirnhausen in 1676.
Asked how we would prove a priori the existence of bodies figured
and in motion,^ Spinoza answers that "From extension as con-
ceived by Descartes, i. e. an inert mass (molem quiescentem) it is
difficult if not impossible to prove the existence of bodies. For
matter at rest will, so far as in it lies, persist in its rest, and, as
well, will not be impelled to motion unless by a more powerful
external cause ; for this reason, I did not hesitate to affirm long ago
that the Cartesian principles of natural philosophy are useless, if
not absurd." According to Tschirnhausen, Descartes, as he su})-
posed motion to have been given to matter by a creative act, did not
view the material universe as a product of inert matter; to which
Spinoza replied somewhat as follows: "As to your question if the
4 To Descartes it was the most general law of physical action Priiic. Phil.
2. c. 43.
5 Cogit. Met. pt. i. c. 6. No. 9.
^ Ethica iii. 6.
'^ Ethica iii. 7.
^Epistle 69.
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diversity of things can be proved a priori from the conception of
extension, I believe I have ah-eady sufficiently shown that it is im-
possible ; and that, therefore, matter is ill-defined b_\' Descartes as
identical with extension {iuatcriaui a Cartesio male dcfiniri per
extensionem), but must rather be explained by an attribute which
expresses an eternal and infinite nature." And though he hoped to
be able to make himself clearer on this point, the opportunity never
came. But what is clear at least is that Spinoza did not accept, in
his last days, the Cartesian conception of material substance as con-
sisting purel}' in extension.
